III. Flak-Korps

The third Flak-Korps was a rather unique unit. There existed other Flak-Korps on the eastern front, but they were only partly composed of motorized units. The III. Flak-Korps was made up of motorized units only¹, even though there were shortages of vehicles.

It is common to emphasize the anti-tank role of the 8,8 cm Flak gun. However, this seems not to be consistent with the employement of the III. Flak-Korps.² The major reason for this is that the 8,8 cm Flak gun was not very suitable for anti-tank missions. Consider the following:

1.   The 8,8 cm Flak gun had a high silhouette. This made it diffiult to dig in and thereby give it protection against enemy artillery fire. The overwhelming allied artillery fire often destroyed the 8,8 cm guns before they got a chance to open fire. The AT guns were not as vulnerable as the AA guns.³

2.   Also the high silhouette made it easy for the enemy to spot the gun once it had opened fire.⁴

3.   The armour penetration capabilities of the 8,8 cm Flak 36 was only about 15 % better than that of the 7,5 cm Pak 40, which was the standard German anti-tank gun. Given the fact that the vast majority of the allied tanks were Shermans, or vehicles with even weaker armour, the 7,5 cm Pak 40 was quite sufficient to deal with most enemy tanks. Only the frontal armour of the Churchill tanks equipped with 6 inch armour was proof against the 7,5 cm AT gun, but that armour was also sufficient to keep out hits from the 8,8 cm Flak 36.

4.   The longer range of the 8,8 cm Flak gun compared to the 7,5 cm AT gun was of course an advantage, but at longer range, accuracy declines for all guns, even the 8,8 cm gun. Thus, the chances of hitting with the first shot was lower. Since the 8,8 cm AA gun was difficult to conceal and easy to spot when it had fired, this made it likely that the enemy tanks could respond with HE fire, or call for indirect artillery on the positions of the Flak guns before they were destroyed at long range.

5.   The much greater weight of the 8,8 cm gun compared to the 7,5 cm AT gun made it difficult to move. This was compounded by the fact that the gun had to be limbered for movement. Thus it was much more difficult to bring the 8,8 cm gun out of the enemys reach if a position had to be abandoned.

This actually made the 7,5 cm Pak 40 a better AT weapon than the 8,8 cm Flak 36. Also it must be remembered that a German infantry division had 20 - 40 7,5 cm anti-tank guns, either towed or self-propelled (including StuG). Of course, the panzer divisions, with their Pz IV and Panther tanks, had an unparallelled ability to combat enemy tanks.

The fact that the 8,8 cm Flak was not suitable for anti-tank misisons was also clearly recognized by the commanders and men serving in the III. Flak-Korps. Both in the post-war manuscript produced by the corps commander, Wolfgang Pickert⁵, and in a report, dated 20 September 1944, discussing the experiences from the actions of the corps during the battles in Normandy⁶, this is clear.

First and foremost, the corps was employed in the air defence role⁷. This was the main mission and initially it extended from the front to a line from Falaise to Le Beny Bocage⁸. The second important mission of the corps was to provide indirect fire to support the ground combat units.⁹ The chief reason for this was the shortage of GHQ artillery. Due to the range of the 8,8 cm guns, this could often be provided from the positions they were to protect from air attack.

If enemy tanks had broken through, the flak units were expected to engage them if they reached the positions of the flak. Also the corps was supplied with Flakkampfgruppen. These were created for ground combat. However, they did not arrive at the corps until it already was in Normandy. When these Flakkampfgruppen arrived, they were deemed to be insufficiently trained. Consequently they were placed in the Trun area to train and were not sent into combat until the British Goodwood offensive opertation in July. Each Flakkampfgruppe consisted of four Flakkamftruppen, which each had two 8,8 cm Flak guns. Three such Flakkamfgruppen were created.¹⁰

The Flakkampfgruppen were not very successful in combat. The results were not in proportion to the casualties.¹¹ They lost about 35 8,8 cm guns and 70 light Flak guns, while the number of tanks they knocked out were assessed to be twenty.¹²

The main components of the corps were the four Flak-Sturm-Regiments. These were numbered 1 - 4. These had been formed by utilizing the regiment staffs 32, 36, 37 and 79 respectively.¹³ It seems that these numbers were occasionally used in Normandy too , which probably have caused some confusion as to which Flak units actually participated in the battle. The regiments had recently recieved their Flak-Sturm designation when the allied forces landed.

Nominally each regiment was supposed to have three battalions with five batteries each. Three of the batteries were supposed to have 8,8 cm guns and two were to be equipped with light AA guns. Altogether this meant that the corps was supposed to have 36 batteries with heavy guns and 24 with light guns.

In reality the organization of the corps did not correspond exactly to this pattern. On 23 June it had 27 heavy batteries and 26 light batteries.¹⁴ This had increased to 29 heavy and 40 light batteries by 8 August.¹⁵ Since a heavy battery had four 8,8 cm guns, the authorized strength of the corps included 108 such guns on 23 June and 116 on 8 August. Three of the heavy batteries had the more powerful 8,8 cm Flak 41.¹⁶ With its higher muzzle velocity it also had much better armour penetration capabilities than the 8,8 cm Flak 18/36/37 which made up the vast majority of the heavy batteries.

According to Pickert the corps had an authorized strength of about 12 000 men at the beginning of June.¹⁷ This estimate seem reasonable since the authorized strength for 27 heavy batteries, 26 light batteries, twelve battalion staffs and three regiment staffs was 12 027 men.¹⁸ To this should be added the corps staff and its support elements. The corps did not have any means to repair vehicles and other heavy equipment.¹⁹ Since the corps was at close to full strength it probably had a strength of about 12 000 men when it was ordered to move to Normandy.

On D-Day Flak-Sturm-Rgeiment 2, 3 and 4 were located around the Somme-estuary, while Flak-Sturm-Rgt. 1 was deployed between Isigny and Bayeux.²⁰ The latter regiment had recently been redeployed to that area.²¹

The corps (minus Flak-Sturm-Rgt. 1) received orders on afternoon D-Day to move to Normandy as rapidly as possible.²² During the night between 6 and 7 June the corps had reached Paris.²³ Most of the corps had reached positions south west of Caen on the evening 8 June.²⁴

During the march to Normandy the corps suffered greater casualties than most German units marching to Normandy. In his post-war manuscript Pickert estimated casualties at 100 killed, 200 wounded and about 100 vehicles.²⁵ According to the 20 September 1944 experience report, losses during the march included 20 guns, 110 trucks and towing vehicles, 100 motorcycles, passenger cars and trailers.²⁶ In the report the term "Ausfälle" is used, which means that both permanently destroyed equipment and repairable is included. It also includes equipment damaged which has suffered mechanical breakdown or which has been involved in traffic accidents.

The march to Normandy did not only result in losses for the corps. It also shot down about 35 air craft during the movement to Normandy.²⁷

Ammunition supply was a problem for most German units in Normandy and the III. Flak-Korps was no exception. Since no ammunition had been stored in advance in Normandy, the distances to haul the ammunition to the corps were long.²⁸ Despite these difficulties the Flak corps was probably better off than the army. The following amounts of ammunition were delivered to the corps during its operations in Normandy²⁹:

2 716 313 rounds for 2 cm guns
272 057 rounds for 3,7 cm guns
209 946 rounds for 8,8 cm guns

Also the corps received the following number of new guns during its actions in Normandy³⁰:

53 8,8 cm guns
36 3,7 cm guns
72 2 cm guns
12 2 cm guns (4-barreled)

As has been emphasized above, the corps was mainly employed in the air defence role, not in the anti-tank role. This is also reflected in the claims by the corps during the Normandy battle³¹:

Air Craft shot down	462
Tanks destroyed	92
Armoured Cars destroyed	14

Of the tanks destroyed about twelve fell victims to the man-held Panzerfaust close range antitank weapon.³²

It is important to emphasize that the effectiveness of AA guns in the air defence role can not only be measured in numbers of air craft shot down. Equally important is the effect on how the enemy conducts his air operations. A very important effect of the German air defences was that it forced allied air units to operate at higher altitute³³, thus reducing the accuracy of allied air units when they attacked ground targets. Similarly, the main effect of allied air power was not the casualties and equipment losses inflicted, but the indirect effects, such as the German reluctance to move during daylight.³⁴

The number of tanks claimed is quite small. Given the fact that Army and Waffen-SS units claimed to have destroyed 3 663 enemy tanks from 6 June to 21 August³⁵, the III. Flak-Korps can not be regarded as a very important part of German anti-tank defences.

The achievments of the corps did not come without cost. In Pickerts post-war manuscript he estimated that the corps casualties amounted to about 800 killed and 1 500 wounded. He did not know how many missing there were. Fortunately there exist more precise information³⁶:

Killed in Action	Wounded	Missing	Total
662	1 658	3 457	5 777

These figures include from D-Day to the corps retreat into Germany. Evidently Pickerts memory was pretty close to the mark for killed and wounded.

According to Pickert the casualties were mainly caused by artillery. Air attacks on AA units in firing positions had relatively little effect.³⁷ Given the large number of missing it is clear that another major cause was the allied ground units which succeeded in cutting off possible retreat paths for the corps units.

Mainly the corps was employed on the eastern half of the German front in Normandy, against the British units. In particular its participation in halting the British Goodwood operation warrants certain comments. In several publications it is stated that this corps employed "144 AT/AA guns". Probably this refers to 8,8 cm guns, but the number 144 seem to have been derived by assuming that the corps had four regiments with three battalions each and that each battalion had twelve 8,8 cm guns. However, each battalion did not have twelve 8,8 cm guns. As shown above the corps had fewer than 144 8,8 cm guns. Also the guns were not "AT/AA guns" but AA guns.

The Flak-Sturm-Regiments were employed so far to the rear that the British armour units did not encounter them during the operation.³⁸ The three Flakkampfgruppen were however deployed further forward and they did become involved in combat. Since they only had a T/O&E; strength of eight 8,8 cm Flak guns each these units were hardly significant.

The Flak-Sturm-Regiments were employed so far to the rear that the British armour units did not encounter them during the operation.³⁸ The three Flakkampfgruppen were however deployed further forward and they did become involved in combat. Since they only had a T/O&E; strength of eight 8,8 cm Flak guns each these units were hardly significant.

Finally it is worth discussing why the 8,8 cm Flak gun has received such a repution in the history of operation Overlord. In 1940 and 1941, when the German antitank defences mainly consisted of the 3,7 cm AT gun, the 8,8 cm Flak 36 was significantly superior in terms of armour pentration and range. With the introduction of the 7,5 cm Pak 40, the superiority of the 8,8 cm Flak 36 was relatively marginal. However, it seems that the image of the all-pervasive 8,8 cm Flak guns was created in the early years of the war, largely in North Africa. During much of the fighting in North Africa British tank units were equipped with tanks armed with guns that had no HE ammunition. Also the cooperation between British tanks and artillery was often abysmal. In Normandy the behaviour of British forces was quite different however. Hence, the drawbacks of the 8,8 cm Flak gun, described above, were much more pronounced. But still the image of the "88 mm Flak" seem to have been vivid.

Another factor to consider is the fact that there existed several different 8,8 cm guns. At the beginning of the war there were three 8,8 cm AA guns, the Flak 18, Flak 36 and Flak 37. These were very similar and used the same ammunition. Their ballistical performance was identical. During the war new 8,8 cm guns were introduced. First came the Flak 41, which had much higher muzzle velocity, thus improving armour penetration by about 60 %. Also this gun had a much lower profile, making it easier to dig in and conceal. Weighing all factors together it was a much better AT weapon than the Flak 18/36/37. But the Flak 41 was a very rare gun, produced in much smaller numbers than the older types.

There also existed an 8,8 cm AT gun, the Pak 43. This weapon was even more powerful than the Flak 41, though only marginally. The gun was mounted on a very low cruciform carriage of excellent design. Due to lack of carriages, the gun barrel was also mounted on a howitzer carriage. This configuration was called the Pak 43/41. It was higher and clumsier.

The Pak 43/41 and, in particular, the Pak 43 were very good AT guns. They were however issued to Panzerjäger units and occasionally artillery units. They were not used by Flak units.

Another factor which may have contributed to the image of the 8,8 cm Flak gun is the many false identifications in after action reports by allied units. It is a well known fact that German tanks were quite often identified as Tigers by allied soldiers, even in situations where no Tigers particpated. Probably the same phenomen appear with these guns. To allied soldiers German AT fire was, almost by default, from 8,8 cm guns. Also, if a tank was knocked out, it is not easy to see if it was hit by a 8,8 cm shell or one of 7,5 cm calibre. Quite possibly, to many allied tank crews, the first assumption if their tank was destroyed seem to have been that it had been hit by an "88".

Notes:

1	W. Pickert, Das III. Flakkorps in der Normandie-Schlacht, MS # B-597, p. 4.
2	See also H. Meyer, Kriegsgeschichte der 12. SS-Panzer-Division "Hitlerjugend", vol I (Munin Verlag, Osnabrück 1982) p. 203.
3	Gen.Kdo. III. Flakkorps, Br.B.Nr. (Ia op 2) 163/44 g.Kdos, 20.9.44., p. 9. A copy of this is attached to the manuscript MS # B-597.
4	Ibid.
5	Pickert, op.cit.
6	See note 3
7	See note 3, p. 5.
8	Pickert, op.cit., p. 14.
9	See note 3, p. 7. See also Pickert, op.cit., p. 19.
10	See Pickert, op.cit., p. 17 and Anlage 1.
11	Pickert, op.cit., p. 20.
12	See note 3, p. 10-
13	W. Dierich, Die Verbände der Luftwaffe 1935 - 1945 (Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart 1976) p. 351-3.
14	H. A. Koch, Flak (Podzun, Bad Nauheim 1954) p. 443.
15	Ibid.
16	Ibid, p. 139.
17	Pickert, op.cit., p. 38.
18	Authorized strength was: 167 men for heavy battery, 210 men for light battery, 130 men for battalion staff and 166 men for regiment staff. See H. A. Koch, Flak (Podzun, Bad Nauheim 1954) p. 657.
19	See note 3, p. 18.
20	See note 3, p. 4.
21	Pickert, op.cit., p. 6.
22	Pickert, op.cit., p. 8.
23	Pickert, op.cit., p. 9.
24	Pickert, op.cit., p. 11.
25	Pickert, op.cit., p. 10.
26	See note 3, p. 4.
27	Pickert, op.cit., p. 10.
28	Pickert, op.cit., p. 13.
29	See note 3, p. 16.
30	See note 3, p. 16.
31	See note 3, p. 19.
32	See note 3, p. 17.
33	Pickert, op.cit., p. 15.
34	Pickert, op.cit., p. 36.
35	HGr B Ia Nr. 6375/44 g.Kdos., 21.8.44, T311, R3, F7002227.
36	See note 3, p. 20.
37	Pickert, op.cit., p. 16.
38	Pickert, op.cit., p. 24f and also map in Anlage. Note that the author has got the dates wrong. The British offensive was launched on 18 July, not 19 July.